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The President's Private Dictionary: How 
Secret Definitions Undermine Domestic and 
Transnational Efforts at Executive Branch 
Accountability 
SUDHA SETTY* 
ABSTRACT 
The 2016 EU- U.S. Privacy Shield is an agreement allowing companies 
to move customer data between the European Union and the United States 
without running afoul of heightened privacy protections in the European 
Union. It was developed in response to EU concerns that the privacy rights 
of its citizens have been systematically abrogated by the U.S. government 
in the name of national security, and contains a variety of assurances that 
the United States will respect and protect the privacy rights of EU citizens. 
How trustworthy are the U.S. assurances under the Privacy Shield? 
Both the Bush and Obama administrations secretly interpreted the terms 
of treaties, statutes, and regulations in a manner that allowed them to take 
controversial actions, keep those actions secret, and later invoke national 
security to defend the legality of those actions if they became public. In 
cases involving torture, bulk data collection, and targeted killing, these 
administrations did so despite the common and objective understanding 
of applicable legal constraints not providing authorization for the very 
actions that they claimed were legal. 
It remains an open question as to whether the Trump administration 
will interpret the Privacy Shield in a similarly misleading manner: one in 
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which public assurances suggest compliance with the Privacy Shield's 
constraints, but the administration's private interpretation of the Privacy 
Shield secretly breaches EU privacy protections. This Article considers 
possible ways to constrain the executive branch from relying on secret 
interpretations that would undermine the Privacy Shield's transnational 
attempts at accountability. 
INTRODUCTION 
"Trust is a must, it is what will drive our digital future. ''1 
National security related surveillance is always a tricky business. On 
the one hand, much of its operational details are solely in the hands of 
the executive branch and are kept out of the public eye to improve its 
effectiveness. On the other hand, when the public does not understand 
the scope of or limitations to surveillance, and the laws meant to 
constrain such surveillance seem ineffective, secrecy opens the door for 
any number of constitutional, civil, and human rights to be violated. The 
government can undercut privacy and dignity rights and chill freedom of 
expression, religion, association, and thought. As a result, trust in 
government and its institutions erodes. 
The European Union guarantees greater privacy and dignity rights 
than have been found under the U.S. Constitution, bringing the two 
jurisdictions into a potential conflict when a transnational privacy issue 
occurs. One context in which these competing, transnational privacy 
interests are often in tension involves the transfer of data for business 
purposes. Many large companies utilize data transfers on a daily basis 
and in large volume. They depend on agreements between the United 
States and the European Union to facilitate these data transfers in a 
manner that comports with the legal framework of both jurisdictions, 
thus limiting the potential for a legal challenge. 
From July 2000 to October 2015, companies relied on an agreement 
between the U.S. Department of Commerce and the European 
Commission for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality called the Safe 
Harbor Privacy Principles2 (Safe Harbor) to enable these transnational 
data transfers. In the words of one of the U.S. regulators involved in 2000, 
the Safe Harbor "bridges the differences between EU and U.S. 
1. Press Release, European Comm'n, Restoring Trust in Transatlantic Data Flows 
Through Strong Safeguards: European Commission Presents EU -U.S. Privacy Shield (Feb. 
29, 2016) (quoting European Commission Vice-President and European Commissioner for 
the Digital Single Market Andrus Ansip on the agreement over the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield). 
2. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SAFE HARBOR PRIVACY PRINCIPLES (2000) [hereinafter 
SAFE HARBOR]. 
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approaches to privacy protection and will ensure that data flows between 
the U.S. and the EU are not interrupted. As a result, it should help ensure 
that e-commerce continues to flourish." 3 The Safe Harbor promoted 
transnational commerce and withstood legal challenge based on the 
different standards of privacy in the United States and European Union 
for over a decade.4 
In June 2013, the global community became more aware of the 
breadth and depth of U.S. surveillance of internet and telephone activity 
in the name of national security. Former National Security Agency (NSA) 
contractor Edward Snowden disclosed a trove of information regarding 
U.S. domestic and global surveillance conducted by the U.S. government 
in conjunction with other governments. Those disclosures allowed the 
public to understand that personal internet data, if transferred to the 
United States, was likely accessible to the U.S. government under a 
variety of national security justifications and legal authorizations. 
Because the United States specifically carved out national security from 
its obligations under the Safe Harbor, it had not prevented any U.S. 
agency involved in national security matters from accessing and utilizing 
the personal data of European citizens. 5 
These developments prompted Austrian law student and Facebook 
user Maximilian Schrems to bring suit before Ireland's data protection 
commissioner. Schrems alleged that the data in his Facebook account 
that was transferred to and from the United States as part ofFacebook's 
business operations was, unbeknownst to him, accessible by the NSA and 
other U.S. government agencies, which constituted a violation of his 
rights as an EU citizen. As discussed in Part I, the European Court of 
Justice (CJEU) agreed and invalidated the Safe Harbor agreement 
between the European Union and the United States. It held that the 
purpose of the Safe Harbor was to enable private companies to move 
customer-related data between the European Union and the United 
States without running afoul of heightened protections for personal 
privacy in the European Union, and that the Snowden disclosures made 
clear that the central purpose of the Safe Harbor was not being fulfilled. 
The CJEU decision led to a fast-paced set of negotiations by U.S. and 
EU regulators that culminated in the creation of a new agreement, known 
as the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework Principles (Privacy Shield), in 
3. Letter from Robert S. LaRussa, Acting Under Sec'y, Int'l Trade Admin. (July 21, 
2000), https:/!build.export.gov/main!safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018494. 
4. See generally Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7 (outlining safe 
harbor privacy principles between the EU and U.S. Department of Commerce). 
5. See SAFE HARBOR, supra note 2 ("Adherence to these Principles may be limited ... 
to the extent necessary to meet national security, public interest, or law enforcement 
requirements."). 
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February 2016.6 The new Privacy Shield looked to heighten protections 
for the data privacy of European citizens and brought into focus the 
extent of the difference between the United States and European Union 
safeguards of individual rights. In particular, it focused on the extent to 
which consumers have the right to protect their data from being sold to 
third parties and from national security surveillance and data mining by 
the U.S. government. The Privacy Shield included a number of 
safeguards to assure EU regulators that U.S. intelligence agencies would 
respect the data privacy guarantees of EU citizens, including written 
guarantees by U.S. government officials as to their adherence to the 
delineated privacy protections, annual privacy reviews conducted by the 
U.S. government and EU regulators, and the appointment of a data 
privacy ombudsperson with the U.S. State Department to field any 
complaints from EU residents alleging privacy violations by a corporation 
or by the U.S. government.7 Despite some criticism that the Privacy 
Shield did not sufficiently address the concerns of the CJEU in Schrems,B 
it was finalized in July 2016.9 
This Article considers the theoretically robust protections for privacy 
embedded in the Privacy Shield and potential problems in the way the 
6. See Mark Scott, E. U. and U.S. Release Details on Trans-Atlantic Data Transfer Deal, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/01/technology/eu-us-trans-
atlantic-data -transfer-deal.html. 
7. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, E.U.-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK PRINCIPLES 
(2016) [hereinafter PRIVACY SHIELD]; Mark Scott, European Privacy Regulators Want 
Details on 'Safe Harbor' Data Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
02/04/technology/european-privacy-regulators-want-more-details-Dn-us-safe-harbor-data-dealhtml 
(detailing some of the concerns surrounding the enforcement of the potential privacy 
protections discussed in the negotiations for the Privacy Shield). 
8. See Catherine Stupp, Privacy Shield Agreement Signed off Despite Vote Abstentions, 
EURACTIV (July 8, 2016), http://www.euractiv.com/section!digital/news/privacy-shield-agreement-
signed-Dff-despite-vote-abstentions/. 
9. See Commission Implementing Decision 2016/1250, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 1 (EU); Mark 
Scott, Europe Approves New Trans-Atlantic Data Transfer Deal, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/technology/eunashvirope-eu-us-privacy-shield..html. 
Regulators heralded the approval of the Privacy Shield based both on the privacy 
protections and the enabling of transnational business: 
With the approval of the EU -U.S. Privacy Shield, we send an important 
message to the world: The sharing of ideas and information across 
borders is not only good for our businesses but also for our communities 
and our people. For businesses, the free flow of data makes it possible 
for a startup in Silicon Valley to hire programmers in the Czech 
Republic .... For consumers, the free flow of data means that you can 
take advantage of the latest, most innovative digital products and 
services, no matter where they originate. 
Penny Pritzker, U.S. Sec'y of Commerce, Remarks at the E.U.-U.S. Privacy Shield 
Framework Press Conference (July 12, 2016), https://www.commerce.gov/news/secretary-
speeches/2016/07/remarks-us-secretary-commerce-penny-pritzker-eu-us-privacy-shield. 
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United States might privately interpret its obligations under the Privacy 
Shield. Considering those pitfalls, this Article offers a suggestion for 
reforming the Privacy Shield to increase the likelihood that it will be 
interpreted and implemented by the United States in ways that 
adequately address the concerns of the CJEU and properly protect 
fundamental privacy rights for EU citizens. 
Part I of this Article reviews the development and extent of privacy 
rights protected by EU-level institutions and discusses why the CJEU 
held that the Safe Harbor was unable to adequately protect those rights. 
Part II considers some problematic examples of misleading interpretive 
methodology and constructive secrecy10 when it comes to national 
security matters: situations in which the U.S. government claimed 
adherence to a certain set of publicly available principles, but its 
private-and often secret-interpretation of the obligations set forth in 
the public document were actually quite different from what the public 
believed the obligations to entail. If the U.S. government's private 
interpretation of the Privacy Shield is significantly different than the 
commonly understood meanings of the terms of the deal, this would be a 
matter for serious concern in terms of the substantive enforcement of the 
negotiated agreemen't and for the rule of law. Given the risk of 
interpretive dissonance and constructive secrecy with regard to the 
Privacy Shield, Part III offers a simple suggestion for reform. 
I. THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVACY RIGHTS 
The EU framework for individual privacy rights relies on overlapping 
legislative and constitutional bases.n The interpretation of the 
framework, largely the work of the CJEU, limits government, law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies, and private companies in terms of 
their access to the personal information of EU residents. In doing so, the 
CJEU is at the forefront of institutions attempting to carve out a space 
for individuals to retain control over what information is made public and 
made available to governments, law enforcement, and the intelligence 
community.I2 It remains to be seen in the coming years whether the 
10. Constructive secrecy is discussed in detail in Part II, infra. 
11. Federico Fabbrini, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Rights to Data 
Privacy: The EU Court of Justice as a Human Rights Court, in THE EU CHARTER OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AS A BINDING INSTRUMENT 261 (Sybe de Vries et al. eds., 2015). 
12. See Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post- och telestyrelsen, Case C-203/15, 2016 E.C.R. 'I! 112 
("Tele2''). This December 2016 CJEU decision invalidated sections of the United Kingdom's 
Data Protection and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 that required bulk collection of 
telecommunications metadata and invalidated data retention orders issued by the Swedish 
Post and Telecom Authority, on the basis that EU privacy law precludes domestic legislation 
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CJEU and other EU institutions continue to push forward in protecting 
privacy rights or the CJEU eventually succumbs to substantial 
governmental and private sector pressure to allow for more data 
collection as part of a neoliberal model of governance. As evidenced by the 
Schrems decision in 2015, the CJEU has thus far robustly protected 
privacy rights. 
The CJEU decision in Schrems drew on a relatively strong backdrop 
of EU protections for informational privacy that had been in place for 
decades. In 1995, the adoption of a Data Protection Directive included the 
affirmative obligation of EU Member States to "protect the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to 
privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data."l3 Further, 
Member States are responsible for ensuring that data collection is not 
excessive and is conducted only when the target has given consent.14 The 
standard for compliance under the Data Protection Directive turns on 
either affirmative consent or the data collection being "necessary:"l5 
Member States shall provide that personal data may be 
processed only if: (a) the data subject has unambiguously 
given his consent; or (b) processing is necessary for the 
performance of a contract to which the data subject is 
party or in order to take steps at the request of the data 
subject prior to entering into a contract; or (c) processing 
is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to 
which the controller is subject; or (d) processing is 
necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data 
subject; or (e) processing is necessary for the performance 
of a task carried out in the public interest or in the 
exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in 
a third party to whom the data are disclosed; or (f) 
processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate 
interests pursued by the controller or by the third party 
or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where 
such interests are overridden by the interests for 
that provides for "general and indiscriminate retention of all traffic and location data of all 
subscribers and registered users." Press Release No. 145/16, E.C.J. (Dec. 21, 2016). 
13. Directive 95/46/EC, art. 1, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38. This Directive will be replaced 
by the more comprehensive General Data Protection Regulation that will go into effect in 
May 2018. See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April2016, 2016 O.J. (L 119) L 
14. Directive 95/46/EC, art. L 
15. Id. art. 7. 
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In terms of the first way in which the Data Protection Directive has 
historically been satisfied, European Union users of Face book and many 
other services have given their consent to transfer data through the use 
of Standard Contractual Clausesl7 that the European Commission 
preapproved as satisfying data protection requirements. In consenting to 
user agreements that contain these Standard Contractual Clauses, 
European citizens may have wittingly or unwittingly contributed to the 
undercutting of their own guaranteed fundamental right to privacy.l8 
Litigation on the question of consent and the use of Standard Contractual 
Clauses is ongoing. As such, it is still unclear how the European courts 
view arguments regarding whether consent is made unknowingly or 
without meaningful choice and, therefore, whether privacy rights are 
implicated when consumers consent to the sharing of their data. 19 
Regarding the second prong, the Data Protection Directive is directed 
at governments and private entities alike. As evidenced in Schrems, the 
European Union has been skeptical of the stated corporate need for 
seamless information transfer about individuals across international 
16. Id. (emphasis added). 
17. See Model Contracts for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries, EUR. 
COMM'N (Nov. 24, 2016); Christopher Kuner, Improper Implementation of EU Data 
Protection Law Regarding Use of the Standard Contractual Clauses in Germany, (Oct. 6, 
2006), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfin?abstract_id=1444813 (critiquing the 
Standard Contractual Clauses for undercutting individual privacy rights). 
18. See Francesca Bignami, Transatlantic Privacy Regulation: Conflict and Cooperation, 
78 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 239-40 (2015); European Ruling Is Merely a Symbolic 
Victory for Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/09/o 
pinionleuropean-ruling-is-merely-a-symbolic-victory-fur-privacy.html. 
19. Soon after the 2015 CJEU ruling in Schrems, Schrems himself challenged the 
standard form contractual language used by Facebook before the Irish Data Protection 
Commissioner. See Update on Litigation Involving Facebook and Maximilian Schrems: 
Explanatory Memo, OFFICE OF THE DATA PROT. COMM'R, https:l/www.dataprotection.ie/docs/2 
8-9-2016-Explanatory-memo-on-litigation-involving-Facebook-and-Maximilian-Schrems/1598.htm 
(Mar. 16, 2017). The Data Protection Commissioner issued a Draft Decision in May 2016 
that Facebook's contractual language did not adequately address the concerns over data 
privacy. See id. The question of whether the matter should be referred to the CJEU for 
consideration was heard by the Irish High Court in February 2017. See id. As ofApril2017, 
the Irish Data Protection Commissioner had not yet made a decision as to whether to refer 
Schrems's case to the CJEU. See id. A similar concern over data privacy was apparent in 
Tele2, in which the CJEU opined that, in order for European telecommunications providers 
to comport with their EU privacy obligations, "national legislation must make provision for 
the data to be retained within the European Union and for the irreversible destruction of 
the data at the end of the data retention period." Tele2, supra note 12, ,I 122. 
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borders.20 Regular and voluminous transfers of user data are essential to 
Facebook's ability to process, store, and monetize user data. Schrems 
contested the transfer of the data in his Facebook profile from Ireland, 
where Facebook's European operations are headquartered, to the United 
States. Ireland's Data Protection Commissioner denied Schrems's initial 
complaint on the grounds that a 2000 European Commission Decision 
found that the Safe Harbor provides sufficient protection for consumer 
data. 21 
The Irish High Court heard Schrems' appeal and sought guidance 
from the CJEU as to whether a domestic data protection authority had 
the right, despite the 2000 European Commission decision, to conduct an 
independent investigation as to whether the 1995 Data Protection 
Directive was being enforced in ways that provided adequate protection 
to EU customers. As an initial matter, the CJEU found that domestic 
data protection commissions in the European Union had such authority. 
The CJEU also took on the central issue that Schrems raised: 
whether the Safe Harbor was an insufficient control on U.S. data sharing 
practices, particularly in light of the 2013 Snowden disclosures. Schrems 
pointed to two conflicting principles. The first was the guarantee of 
privacy protection as a fundamental human right under the Data 
Protection Directive and Article 7 of the Charter of the European Union. 
Article 25 of the Data Protection Directive makes the obligations of EU 
nations clear: 
1. The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a 
third country of personal data ... may take place only if . 
. . the third country in question ensures an adequate level 
of protection. 
2. The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a 
third country shall be assessed in the light of all the 
circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or 
set of data transfer operations; particular consideration 
shall be given to the nature of the data, the purpose and 
duration of the proposed processing operation or 
operations, the country of origin and country of final 
destination, the rules oflaw, both general and sectoral, in 
force in the third country in question and the professional 
20. See Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection Comm'r, 2015 E.C.R. 650, '1f 34 
(noting that legislation allowing general access to electronic data transfers undercuts the 
fundamental right to private life). 
21. See id. 1l'1[ 5--10 (discussing Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, supra note 4). 
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This protective language conflicts, however, with the second 
principle embodied in the language of the Safe Harbor, which qualifies 
the obligations of U.S. companies in numerous ways: 
Adherence to these Principles may be limited: (a) to the 
extent necessary to meet national security, public 
interest, or law enforcement requirements; (b) by statute, 
government regulation, or case-law that create conflicting 
obligations or explicit authorisations, provided that, in 
exercising any such authorisation, an organisation can 
demonstrate that its non-compliance with the Principles 
is limited to the extent necessary to meet the overriding 
legitimate interests furthered by such authorisation. 23 
The CJEU evaluated the privacy protection against the national 
security carve-out, along with information about the actual domestic 
practices of the United States that could protect or undercut privacy.24 
Looking at the actual practices of the United States in terms of bulk data 
and metadata collection and storage and the lack of effective oversight of 
these practices, the CJEU concluded that the Safe Harbor did not 
adequately protect the fundamental right to privacy as guaranteed under 
the EU Charter and the Data Protection Directive.25 Ultimately, it held 
that the entire agreement was invalid. 26 
The Schrems decision had immediate effects for regulators in several 
countries: numerous domestic privacy regulators within the EU began 
taking a closer look at whether their citizens' data was being misused by 
U.S. companies in ways that violated EU privacy rights. As a result, a 
number of U.S. companies were ordered to modify their practices for data 
collection and use. 27 Also, U.S. and EU negotiators began talks to draw 
22. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 13, art. 25. 
23. Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. 650, ,18 (citing U.S. Department of Commerce communications 
regarding its safe harbor obligations). 
24. Id. '1J 75. 
25. See id. ,,,, 90-96 ("In particular, legislation permitting the public authorities to have 
access on a generalised basis to the content of electronic communications must be regarded 
as compromising the essence of the fundamental right to respect for private life, as 
guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter .... "). 
26. Id. ,, 106. 
27. See, e.g., Facebook Hit by French Privacy Order, BBC (Feb. 9, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-35531224 (discussing the order of the French data 
protection authority, the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertes, to 
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up a replacement for the Safe Harbor that would provide privacy 
protections satisfactory to the CJEU while also letting companies conduct 
the transnational data transfers and processing that is integral to their 
business models and worth billions of dollars annually.28 
In February 2016, negotiators came to agreement over the EU-U.S. 
Privacy Shield, enabling heightened oversight of U.S. governmental data 
collection.29 Various safeguards were proposed to assure EU regulators 
that U.S. intelligence agencies would respect the data privacy guarantees 
for EU citizens. Those safeguards focused on three particular areas. First, 
U.S. government officials provided written guarantees as to the manner 
in which European privacy rights were being respected and data 
collection would be limited.30 Second, the U.S. government promised to 
undertake annual data privacy reviews in conjunction with their EU 
counterparts.31 Third, the U.S. State Department promised to appoint a 
data privacy ombudsperson to field complaints from EU residents 
regarding the violation of privacy rights by a corporation or by the U.S. 
government. 32 
Both U.S. and EU negotiators stated that protecting the privacy 
rights of EU residents was paramount, and the United States attempted 
to demonstrate its public commitment to the parameters of the Privacy 
Shield by publishing detailed letters by administrative agencies to that 
effect.33 Despite those reassurances and even though the new framework 
was approved in July 2016, deep skepticism remains as to whether the 
U.S. intelligence agencies will abide by the terms of the new Privacy 
Facebook to prevent unfettered online access to data about French Facebook users, and to 
stop transferring all of its French user data to the United States). 
28. See Kelly Couturier, How Europe Is Going After Coogle, Amazon and Other U.S. Tech 
Giants, N.Y. TIMES (updated Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04 
/13/technologylhow-europe-is-going-after-us-tech-giants.html (noting the business value of the 
data transfers as part of the backdrop that pressured negotiators to move quickly on 
replacing the invalidated safe harbor provisions after Schrems). 
29. See Press Release, European Comm'n, supra note 1. 
30. See generally Letter from Penny Pritzker, U.S. Sec'y of Commerce, to Vera Jourova, 
Comm'r for Justice, Consumers, & Gender Equal., European Comm'n (Feb. 23, 2016) (noting 
the inclusion, with the Privacy Shield, of letters from the Federal Trade Commission, 
Department of Transportation, and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, each 
detailing the ways in which each agency would comply with the parameters of the Privacy 
Shield). 
31. See, e.g., PRIVACY SHIELD, supra note 7, Annex I: Arbitral Model. 
32. See id. Annex A: EU -U.S. Privacy Shield Ombudsperson Mechanism. 
33. See, e.g., Letter from RobertS. Litt, Office of the Gen. Counsel of the Office of the 
Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, to Justin S. Antonipillai & Ted Dean (Feb. 22, 2016) (sending a 
detailed letter to the U.S. Department of Commerce and the International Trade 
Administration describing the information that the ODNI shared with European Union 
regulators in the process of negotiating the Privacy Shield). 
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Shield, 34 particularly in light of the post-September 11 practice of the U.S. 
government to use national security as a pretext for reinterpreting its 
obligations under international law and transnational agreements. 
II. POTENTIAL PITFALLS IN INTERPRETING THE PRNACY SHIELD 
Numerous important concerns hang over the new Privacy Shield, 35 
and this Part focuses on one of the interpretive questions: how will the 
United States construe the limitations in the Privacy Shield as an 
operational matter? Will it comport with the generally understood 
meaning of the terms of the agreement, or will it use a type of 
"constructive secrecy" to undermine the CJEU's decision in Schrems? 
Constructive secrecy can be best understood as occurring when the 
government makes a commitment on terms that are commonly 
understood, but the government has a second interpretation of that 
commitment-kept secret from the public-that is quite different than 
the public understanding. Under such circumstances, the government 
may claim that it has abided by its public commitment and that it is not 
developing secret law and policy that undermines the public commitment; 
in fact, the meaning on which the government is relying may be 
technically available through piecing together a variety of sources and 
making inferential leaps as to what the government is actually doing. 36 
But if the government allows the dissonance between the publicly 
understood meaning and the private, legally operative meaning to stand, 
then oversight becomes less effective, transnational counterparties 
cannot properly hold the executive branch to account, and the rule of law 
is undermined-all in secret. 37 
Although it seems Orwellian to foster or at least allow for a 
disjunctive understanding of a legally operative term in order to further 
utilitarian national security ends, the last fifteen years suggest that this 
34. See Mark Scott, U.S. and Europe in 'Safe Harbor' Data Deal, but Legal Fight May 
Await, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/technology/us-
europe-safe-harbor-data-deaLhtmL 
35. See Peter Margulies, Privacy Shield's Prospects: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 
LAWFARE (Mar. 3, 2016, 8:50AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/privacy-shields-prospects-
good -bad -and-ugly. 
36. See generally Sudha Setty, NATIONAL SECURITY SECRECY: COMPARATIVE EFFECTS ON 
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW (forthcoming Cambridge Univ. Press 2017) (introducing 
the concept of constructive secrecy and its implications for oversight in national security 
contexts). 
37. See Shirin Sinnar, Rule of Law Tropes in National Security, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1566, 
1568-69 (2016) ("By publicly promoting a known standard but concealing its actual 
interpretation, the national security executive hinders meaningful evaluation of the extent 
to which its actions comport with individual rights, democratic values, and the law itself."). 
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kind of constructive secrecy is not uncommon. Its use in both the Bush 
and Obama administrations should prompt further inquiry into the 
trustworthiness of recent U.S. government reassurances regarding the 
Privacy Shield. In the post-September 11 context, both the Bush and 
Obama administrations interpreted treaties, statutes, and regulations in 
a manner that allowed the executive branch to take desired but 
controversial actions, keep those actions secret for some time, and later 
claim their actions were legally authorized when those actions became 
public. These administrations did so despite the common and objective 
understanding of applicable legal constraints seeming not to authorize 
the actions that the administrations claimed were authorized. The 
sometimes inconsistent decisions made by the Trump administration 
thus far with regard to national security, privacy rights, and the 
obligation to follow existing law also suggest that the European Union 
should be wary as to how the Trump administration will interpret its 
obligations under the Privacy Shield. 38 
Three examples from the last fifteen years-the legal justification for 
torture, the use of weaponized drones to kill individuals outside of a 
theater of war, and the mass data collection and surveillance of U.S. 
citizens within the United States-illustrate how corrosive secrecy can 
be and serve as a reminder as to why measures should be taken to 
minimize the risk of misleading interpretative approaches that may 
undermine the letter and aspirations of the Privacy Shield under the 
Trump administration and beyond. 
A. Torture 
The Bush administration legitimized torture as an interrogation and 
control technique for detainees through the development of a body of 
secret law that authorized torture despite international and domestic 
prohibitions. 39 As part of that effort, administration lawyers gave legal 
comfort to those engaging in or promoting the use of torture. Both the 
acts of torture and the legal justification for it were deliberately kept 
secret so as to avoid accountability and a public airing of the 
administration's policy.40 The justification for torture was based 
38. See, e.g., Evan Perez, Pamela Brown & Kevin Liptak, Inside the Confusion of the 
Trump Executive Order and Travel Ban, CNN (Jan. 30, 2017) (describing the confusion 
among federal government officials and the public as to the scope and applicability of 
President Trump's Jan. 27, 2017 executive order regarding immigration). 
39. Sudha Setty, No More Secret Laws: How Transparency of Executive Branch Legal 
Policy Doesn't Let the Terrorists Win, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 579, 591 (2009). 
40. Id. at 593-94. 
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primarily on two August 2002 memoranda from the Office of Legal 
Counsel in the Department of Justice (OLC)-held secret until leaked 
years later-that analyzed the definition of "torture" as applied to 
interrogation techniques used on persons captured in the so-called "war 
on terror" and held outside of the United States. 41 
The first memorandum42 was drafted by then-OLC attorney John 
Yoo43 and signed by then-Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee. 
Although the Bush administration relied on this memorandum from 2002 
to 2004 to delineate those interrogation techniques that were-under its 
interpretation-lawful, 44 the memorandum itself was only made public 
through a mid-2004 leak, after the public learned of detainee abuses at 
the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.45 Congressional and public outrage46 at 
the authorization of harsh interrogation techniques, like waterboarding, 
which had long been considered a form of torture under international law, 
and the narrowing of the conventional definition of torture47 to provide 
41. Id. at 589 (describing the rule oflaw problems associated with secret lawmaking by 
the Office of Legal Counsel). 
42. Memorandum from JayS. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice Office 
of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002) 
[hereinafter Bybee Memorandum]. The Bybee Memorandum was superseded, in part, by 
another memorandum drafted by the acting head of the OLC, Daniel Levin, that addressed 
the applicability of the Convention Against Torture and disavowed some of the conclusions 
made in the Bybee Memorandum. See Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant 
Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to James B. Corney, Deputy Att'y 
Gen. (Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Levin Memorandum]. 
43. John Yoo, Behind the "Torture Memos", SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 2, 2005), 
http://www.aei.org/publicationlbehind-the-torture-memos/. 
44. The Defense Department incorporated significant portions of the language from the 
Bybee Memorandum in its own report on interrogation practices. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., 
WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON 
TERRORISM 61-69 (2003) (enumerating thirty-five techniques and evaluating the usefulness 
of those techniques); Douglas Jehl et al., C.I.A. Is Seen as Seeking New Role on Detainees, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/16/politics/cia-is-seen-as-
seeking-new-role-on-detainees.html (explaining that the Bybee Memorandum was "sought 
by the C.I.A. to protect its employees from liability''). 
45. See Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture; 
Justice Dept. Gave Advice in 2002, WASH. POST (June 8, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.co 
m/wp-dyn/articles/A23373-2004Jun7.html ("[T]he Justice Department advised the White House 
that torturing al Qaeda terrorists in captivity abroad 'may be justified,' and that 
international laws against torture 'may be unconstitutional if applied to interrogations' 
conducted in President Bush's war on terrorism .... "). 
46. See Adam Liptak, Legal Scholars Criticize Memos on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 
2004, at A14 ("[A] law professor at the University of Chicago, said: 'It's egregiously bad. It's 
very low level, it's very weak, embarrassingly weak, just short of reckless."'). 
4 7. See Bybee Memorandum, supra note 42, at 46 ("[W]e conclude that torture as defined 
in and proscribed by [the Convention Against Torture], covers only extreme acts .... 
Because the acts inflicting torture are extreme, there is [a] significant range of acts that 
though they might constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment fail to 
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legal comfort to interrogators who engaged in harsh techniques,48 forced 
President Bush to disavow the use of torture during interrogations. 49 
The second August 2002 memorandum, issued on the same day as the 
first and also authorized by Bybee, 5° reinforced the administration's view 
that the definition of torture was extremely narrow and required specific 
intent by interrogators to cause serious physical or mental harm. 
Additionally, the second memorandum's specific intent requirement 
protected interrogators. 51 A heavily redacted version of this 
memorandum was released by the Bush administration on July 24, 2008, 
in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. 52 Only the 
late 2004 OLC memorandum declaring that "[t]orture is abhorrent both 
to American law and values and to international norms" was voluntarily 
made public by the administration. However, even this memorandJm 
contained legal protection for CIA interrogators to insulate them from 
future prosecution. 53 
A March 2003 OLC memorandum 54 provided additional legal comfort 
to interrogators by asserting that "federal laws prohibiting assault, 
maiming and other [violent] crimes did not apply to military 
interrogators" who questioned captives in the war on terror.55 This 
rise to the level of torture."). The Bybee Memorandum also stated that the proscriptions of 
the Convention Against Torture likely did not apply to the President's execution of the war 
on terror, under the rationale that the Convention infringed upon the President's executive 
authority as Commander-in-Chief. Id. at 36--39 ("[T]he structure of the Constitution 
demonstrates that any power traditionally understood as pertaining to the executive-
which includes the conduct of warfare and the defense of the nation-unless expressly 
assigned in the Constitution to Congress, is vested in the President."). 
48. Additionally, Bybee offered two broad defenses to individuals who used techniques 
which would fall within the narrowed definition of torture: necessity and self-defense. See 
id. at 39--46. 
49. See Eric Mink, Editorial, The Torture Memos Lies, Deceit - and Maybe War Crimes, 
ST. Loms POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 9, 2008, at D1L See generally Levin Memorandum, supra 
note 42 (replacing parts of the Bybee Memorandum that addressed the applicability of the 
Convention Against Torture and disavowed some of the conclusions from the Bybee 
Memorandum). 
50. Memorandum from JayS. Bybee, Assistant Att'y General, U.S. Dep't of Justice Office 
of Legal Counsel, to John Rizzo, Gen. Counsel of the Cent. Intelligence Agency, U.S. Dep't 
of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Second Bybee Memorandum]. 
51. See id. at 16--17. 
52. Documents Released by the CIA and Justice Department in Response to the ACLU's 
Torture FOIA, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/36104res20080724.html (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2017). 
53. Levin Memorandum, supra note 42, at L 
54. See Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of the 
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep't ofDef., U.S. 
Dep't of Justice Office of Legal CounselS n.10 (Mar. 14, 2003). 
55. Dan Eggen & Josh White, Memo: Laws Didn't Apply to Interrogators, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 2, 2008, at AL 
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memorandum sought to insulate U.S. government agents from 
prosecution or other legal liability if they used highly coercive 
interrogation techniques, such as waterboarding, head slapping, and 
exposure of prisoners to extreme temperatures. 56 The memorandum was 
initially classified by the Department of Justice to prevent disclosure but 
was declassified in 2008 after a review undertaken as part of a FOIA 
lawsuit.57 The initial classification was made because of purported 
national security concerns requiring secrecy.5s This memorandum 
contained neither sensitive personal information nor details about 
specific intelligence-gathering programs, but its contents were also kept 
secret from the top lawyers for each branch of the military. 59 
Public knowledge of the abuses at the Abu Ghraib detention center in 
Iraq did not prevent the OLC from continuing to generate its body of 
secret law justifying torture. A nonpublic 2005 opinion authorized torture 
techniques, such as waterboarding, and the use of such techniques in 
combination with each other, for the interrogation of persons designated 
as enemy combatants.60 A late 2005 opinion was drafted after Congress 
passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which specifically outlawed 
some harsh interrogation techniques. 61 This opinion confirmed that CIA 
practices were reconcilable with the Detainee Treatment Act's 
restrictions, once again providing legal cover for CIA interrogators 
against potential future prosecution.62 Finally, a 2006 executive order, 
which was reviewed and approved by the OLC, confirmed authorization 
for the use of "enhanced" interrogation techniques. 63 Additional 
56. See id. 
57. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Secret Bush Administration 
Torture Memo Released Today in Response to ACLU Lawsuit (Apr. 1, 2008), 
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/34 7 4 7prs2008040 1.html. 
58. See Eggen & White, supra note 55. 
59. See id. 
60. See Eggen & White, supra note 55. It was later revealed that certain members of 
Congress were briefed on the use of waterboarding of prisoners as early as 2002, but that 
they were forbidden from taking written notes on the brief, or from disclosing their 
knowledge to anyone, including their own staff members. Joby Warrick & Dan Eggen, Hill 
Briefed on Waterboarding in 2002, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2007, at AL Rep. Jane Harman 
noted that she filed a classified letter objecting to the program, but was prevented from 
speaking publicly due to the rules of secrecy governing her role on an intelligence committee. 
See id. 
61. Detainee Treatment Act of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739. 
62. Scott Shane et al., Secret U.S. Endorsement of Severe Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 4, 2007, at A1. 
63. Id. 
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memoranda regarding interrogation techniques have been issued but not 
made public.64 
Much of the substantive criticism of these memos at the time of the 
leaks turned on the expansive assertion of executive power65 and the 
resulting erosion of due process and human rights protections for persons 
designated as "enemy combatants."66 From a rule oflaw viewpoint, it was 
disturbing that the Bush administration was able to easily and readily 
exploit a structural flaw: it interpreted the lack of a requirement to 
disclose its legal policy as an affirmation that keeping its body of law 
secret was acceptable, insisting that secrecy was necessary to maintain 
the integrity of U.S. national security interests,67 and arguing that 
information as to interrogation techniques would empower terrorists 
planning to attack the United States. 68 The Bush administration then 
used that secrecy to draft a series of memos providing legal comfort for 
arguably illegal actions under international and domestic law, all while 
claiming that it was abiding by its legal commitments. The private 
dictionary of the Bush administration when it came to the meaning of 
"torture" would not have become known but for leaks, press reporting, 
and FOIA litigation regarding the grotesque treatment of detainees. In 
the end, however, torture and the secret legal contortions undertaken by 
64. Id. 
65. Thomas Poguntke & Paul Webb, The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic 
Societies: A Framework for Analysis, in THE PRESIDENTIALIZATION OF POLITICS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MODERN DEMOCRACIES 1 (Thomas Poguntke & Paul Webb eds., 
2005). 
66. See Eggen & White, supra note 55; Editorial, There Were Orders to Follow, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 4, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/04/opinion/04fril.html. (noting that 
the Yoo Memorandum was "81 pages of twisted legal reasoning to justify President Bush's 
decision to ignore federal law and international treaties and authorize the abuse and torture 
of prisoners"). 
67. See Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency's Surveillance 
Authority: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 264-320 (2007) 
[hereinafter Wartime Executive Power] (statement of Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General 
of the United States); Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal 
Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1565 (2007). 
68. See Wartime Executive Power, supra note 67, at 107 (suggesting such revelations 
remind the enemy that they are being monitored); Carol D. Leonnig & Eric Rich, U.S. Seeks 
Silence on CIA Prisons; Court Is Asked to Bar Detainees from Talking About Interrogations, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2006, at Al. The Obama administration echoed this type of language 
when it attempted to justify the type of data gathering and surveillance that was exposed 
by Snowden, and which gave rise to the CJEU's invalidation of the Safe Harbor agreement 
in Schrems. See Jeremy Herb, Intel Panel: DOD Report Finds Snowden Leaks Helped 
Terrorists, THE HILL (Jan. 9, 2014), http:/lthehill.com/policy/defense/194937-intel-panel-
dod-report-finds-snowden-leaks-helped. 
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the Bush administration to justify it undermined both international and 
domestic trust in the Bush administration for its remaining years. 
B. Targeted Killings 
When he took office in 2009, President Obama promised a return to 
the rule of law that would uphold national security interests, civil 
liberties, and the democratic value of governmental transparency. In 
some matters, he fulfilled his promise of cutting back on national security 
secrecy, such as reversing the Bush administration's FOIA policy to make 
access to some types of government information easier.69 However, there 
were numerous areas where those aspirations were not met. In the 
context of the use of drones for targeted killings70 of militants, 71 
administration officials repeatedly emphasized the necessity, efficacy, 
and legality of targeted killings as a counterterrorism tooL 72 
Administration officials resisted the idea that other branches of 
government and the public have the right to know the parameters of the 
drone strike program. The program prompted much debate over the 
threshold question of whether a systemic targeted killing program ought 
to exist, 73 the moral calculus of remote-control extrajudicial killings, 74 the 
legal authorities for such a program, 75 and the specific questions 
69. See Presidential Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies 
Concerning the Freedom oflnformation Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683, 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
70. Although targeted killing is not defined under international law, it is often 
considered to encompass "premeditated acts of lethal force employed by states in times of 
peace or during armed conflict to eliminate specific individuals outside their custody." 
Jonathan Masters, Targeted Killings, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 23, 2013), 
http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627. Although the governments 
that utilize targeted killings differentiate them from assassinations, critics view them as 
similar actions in terms of illegality. Compare Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't 
of State, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The 
Obama Administration and International Law (March 25, 2010) with Complaint at 5, Al-
Aulaqi, et al. v. Panetta, No. 1:12-cv-01192-RMC (D.D.C. July 18, 2012). 
71. See Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis, NEW AM. FOUND., http://securitydata.newam 
erica.net/drones/pakistan-analysis.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (detailing the 
number of drone strikes by the United States in Pakistan since 2004). 
72. See Koh, supra note 70. 
73. See, e.g., Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions), Study on Targeted Killings, U.N. Doc. AIHRC/14/24/Add. 6 (May 28, 2010) 
(questioning the legality of the CIA drone program). 
74. See generally Samuel Isaacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Drones and the Dilemma of 
Modern Warfare, in DRONE WARS: TRANSFORMING CONFLICT, LAW, AND POLICY 388 (Peter 
Bergen & Daniel Rothenberg, eds.) (theorizing the moral dilemma of drone use in the 
context of individuated warfare). 
75. See Alston, supra note 73, ,1,1 28--92 (discussing international law of war principles 
with regard to targeted killings); Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., Speech at Northwestern 
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regarding the legality of its scope in terms of geographic location and 
citizenship of the target.76 Despite these questions, the parameters of the 
targeted killing program remain largely secret, except for leaks and 
instances when it was self-serving to the Obama administration to make 
such information public. 77 
Occasional speeches by Obama administration officials from 2011 
onward, 78 a classified Department of Justice memorandum leaked in 
early 2013,79 and the Presidential Policy Guidance memorandum drafted 
in May 2013 and made public in August 2016 disclosed limited 
information_so The early 2013 leak may have prompted the Presidential 
Policy Guidance, and certainly prompted a May 2013 speech in which 
President Obama looked to both defend the legality of the targeted 
University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012) (outlining the parameters used by the Obama 
administration to determine whether a targeted killing comports with international and 
domestic legal 9bligations); Jeh C. Johnson, Gen. Counsel, Dep't ofDef., Speech on National 
Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration (Feb. 22, 2012) 
(echoing previous administration legal justifications for targeted killing); Koh, supra note 
70 (arguing that the Obama administration's use of targeted killing as a counterterrorism 
tool complied with international and domestic legal obligations). 
76. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing, based on 
standing grounds, the suit of Nasser al-Aulaqi to enjoin the U.S. government from keeping 
his son, U.S. citizen Anwar al-Aulaqi, on its targeted killing list). 
77. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and 
Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HAIN. L. REV. 512 (2013); Stephanie 
Condon, Obama: Anwar al-Awlaki's Death a "Major Blow" to al Qaeda and Affiliates, 
CBSNEWS (Sept. 30, 2011, 4:40 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-anwar-al-
a w lakis-death -a-major-blow-to-al-qaeda -and -affiliates/ (relating comments by President 
Obama about the strategic importance of the targeted killing Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. 
citizen in Yemen). 
78. E.g., John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws, 
Address at Harvard Law School (Sept. 16, 2011); Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att'y 
Gen., to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (May 22, 2013) 
(detailing the administration's legal basis for the use of targeted killings against Anwar al-
Aulaqi and other U.S. citizens overseas); Koh, supra note 70. 
79. See U.S DEp'T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WHITE PAPER: LAWFULNESS OF 
A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL 
LEADER OF AL-QA'IDA OR AN AsSOCIATED FORCE [hereinafter DOJ WHITE PAPER], available 
at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/ilmsnbc/sections/news/020413~DOJ~ White~Paper.pdf (last 
accessed Mar. 5, 2017). 
80. Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside 
the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities, ACLU (May 22, 2013), 
https://www.aclu.org/sitesldefault/files/field~document/presidential_policy _guidance. pdf This memo 
was disclosed as a result of Freedom oflnformation Act litigation brought by the American 
Civil Liberties Union. 
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killings program and the secrecy surrounding it. 81 At the same time that 
the administration discussed and leaked aspects of the program, it also 
relied upon the classified82 nature of the program to shield itself from 
media inquiry83 and from judicial accountability by using the standing 
doctrine and state secrets privilege to secure the dismissal of a suit 
challenging the constitutionality of the program. 84 
In his May 2013 speech, President Obama focused largely on the 
parameters for targeted killings, reiterating known positions of the 
administration, claiming that drone strikes were legal under 
international law standards85 because they defended against "imminent" 
threats,86 stating that U.S. citizenship is no protection against being 
targeted for a drone strike, 87 and making clear that he could keep as much 
81. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense 
University (May 23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-Dffice/2013/05/23/remarks-
president-national-defunse-university [hereinafter May 2013 NDU Speech]. 
82. See generally Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret 'Kill List' Proves a Test of Obama's 
Principles and Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A1 (discussing internal administration 
debates as to whether to declassifY the legal justifications for the drone program, and noting 
that the administration decided not to do so); Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal 
Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2011, at A1 (offering details of a still-classified 
Office of Legal Counsel memorandum justifYing the targeted killings of U.S. citizens). 
83. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
3, 2013) (dismissing requests made under the Freedom of Information Act for documents 
regarding the targeted killing program, based on the administration's claim of necessary 
secrecy surrounding counterterrorism programs); Milena Sterio, The Covert Use of Drones: 
How Secrecy Undermines Oversight and Accountability, 8 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 129, 134-35 
(2015) (detailing the selective and utilitarian disclosures surrounding the covert CIA drone 
program); Jameel Jaffer, Selective Disclosure About Targeted Killing, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 
7, 2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/1704/selective-disclosure-targeted-killing/. 
84. See generally Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing the 
suit brought by the father of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, which sought an injunction 
against the targeted killing of his son, based on a lack of standing and administration claims 
of necessary secrecy surrounding counterterrorism programs). Anwar al-Awlaki was killed 
by a drone strike in September 2011. Charlie Savage, Court Releases Large Parts of Memo 
Approving Killing of American in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/24/us/justice-department-found-it-lawful-to-target-
anwar-al-awlaki.html. 
85. Compare May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 81, with Holder, supra note 78, and 
Koh, supra note 70 (President Obama articulated proportionality and distinction principles 
that largely reflected the standards offered by Attorney General Holder and State 
Department Legal Adviser Koh in previous speeches). 
86. Compare May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 81, with Holder, supra note 78, and 
Koh, supra note 70 (arguing the legality of ordering a targeted killing when, among other 
factors, an undefined "imminence" standard was met). 
87. Compare May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 81 (noting that "the high threshold that 
we've set for taking lethal action applies to all potential terrorist targets, regardless of 
whether or not they are American citizens"), with Holder, supra note 78. 
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of the drone program secret as he wished. 88 This defense of the drone 
program sparked criticism on numerous grounds, including the lack of 
clarity over what constituted an "imminent" threat in the view of the 
Obama administration. 89 Despite years of FOIA litigation and other 
attempts to understand more fully the parameters of the targeted killing 
program, the question remains how the Obama administration's private 
dictionary defined "imminence."90 
The idea of basing the decision to use force against an enemy on the 
question of imminence is not new; in fact, it is quite common in 
discussions of law of war principles governing the preemptive or 
anticipatory use of force as a matter of self-defense.91 The real question 
was how the standard of "imminence" was being interpreted by the 
Obama administration. Was it a well-understood and traditional 
interpretation of the term, such as dealing with an immediate and 
concrete threat that created the overwhelming need to use force because 
there is no time for deliberation?92 Was it a definition of "imminence" 
grounded in the international human rights principles of necessity and 
proportionality, such that lethal force is only justifiable if the attack is 
unavoidable but for the use of that lethal force against the threat?93 From 
the information made available through leaks and disclosures, it seems 
as though neither of these definitions of "imminence" governed the 
Obama administration's decision making regarding targeted killings. In 
fact, a 2011 Justice Department White Paper specifically noted that an 
imminent threat "does not require the United States to have clear 
evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take 
place in the immediate future."94 
The human toll of drone strikes, the U.S definition of the theater of 
war as encompassing the entire world,95 the 2013 government prediction 
that the U.S. efforts against al-Qaeda would last another ten to twenty 
88. See May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 81. 
89. E.g., Fred Kaplan, Obama's Post-9111 World, SLATE (May 23, 2013, 6:25 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2013/05/barack_obama_natio 
nal_defense_university _speech_nothing_new _about_drones.html (noting that the 
administration's definition of an imminent threat meant that "'imminent' doesn't really 
mean 'imminent"'). 
90. See Anna Diakun, Fighting to Bring the Drone Program into the Light, ACLU (Oct. 
25, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/fighting-bring-drone-program-light. 
91. See Rosa Brooks, Drones and the International Rule of Law, 28 J. ETHICS & INT'L 
AFF. 83, 93 (2014). 
92. Id. 
93. See Sinnar, supra note 37, at 1601. 
94. DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 79, at 7. 
95. Spencer Ackerman, Pentagon Spec Ops Chief Sees '10 to 20' More Years of War 
Against Al-Qaida, WIRED (May 16, 2013, 11:49 AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/0 
5/decades-Df-war/. 
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years,96 and the administration's defense of the legality of the program, 
should beget calls for more accountability measures. Congress and/or the 
judiciary should assert themselves to protect against and provide redress 
for arbitrary or abusive decision making in the process of extrajudicial 
killings. Yet Congress has expressed little will to set meaningful 
parameters on the program, and the judiciary has shied away from 
adjudicating the legality of placing targets for extrajudicial killings on a 
government list, even if those targets are U.S. citizens who are not 
"imminently" attacking the United States in any conventional sense of 
the word.97 Actual protection of rights would necessitate more than 
rhetoric about the efficacy and legality of the drone program that cannot 
actually be examined and verified because of national security secrecy. 
As in the case of torture, the legally operative understandings used by 
the Obama administration were unknown and may very well have been 
in violation of public commitments to international and domestic law. 
C. The NSA's Metadata Program 
Legal constraints on intelligence gathering were loosened 
significantly in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The Bush and 
Obama administrations interpreted the USA Patriot Act as authorizing 
the collection and storage of domestic telephony and internet metadata98 
and the collection and content searches of substantial amounts of foreign 
telephone and internet communications. 99 This gave the intelligence 
96. Id. 
97. See generally Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing the 
suit brought by the father of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, which sought an injunction 
against the targeted killing of his son, based on a lack of standing and administration claims 
of necessary secrecy surrounding counterterrorism programs). 
98. The telephony metadata authorized for collection is defined as: 
[I]nclud[ing] comprehensive communications routing information, 
including but not limited to session identifYing information (e.g., 
originating and terminating telephone number, International Mobile 
Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile station [sic] 
Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone 
calling card numbers, and time and duration of call. Telephony 
metadata does not include the substantive content of any 
communication ... or the name, address, or financial information of a 
subscriber or customer. 
See Primary Order at 3 n.1, In reApplication of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an 
Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted] (FISA Ct. 2013), 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Primary0rder_Collection_215.pdf.http://www.dni.gov/f 
iles/documents/Primary0rder_Collection_215.pdf. 
99. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287 
[hereinafter PATRIOT Act] (arguably authorizing the collection and storage of bulk 
metadata); FISA Amendments Act of2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438 
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community a much larger haystack of information from which to attempt 
to glean details of emerging and ongoing terrorist threats.Ioo This shift 
generated critiques from civil libertarians and lawmakers. 10I But until 
late 2013, critics were largely unable to secure significant victories in 
curtailing surveillance powers or even understanding the parameters of 
what was authorized under existing law_I02 The tenor of the public debate 
became more contentious in June 2013 when Edward Snowden began 
revealing classified documents detailing the scope of NSA surveillance on 
foreign and U.S. persons in order to prompt public scrutiny and debate 
over the programs. Snowden disclosed, among many other things, that 
the NSA was engaged in the practice of collecting and retaining the 
metadata of all U.S. telephone customers for five years, and had been 
running searches through that metadata when there was a "reasonable, 
articulable suspicion" that a particular telephone number was associated 
with potential terrorist activity_I03 Further disclosures indicated that 
additional surveillance targeted Muslim community leaders in the 
(2008) (codified as amended at 50 U.S. C.§ 1881a (2015) (authorizing the targeted collection 
of data, including content, from overseas targets). When various provisions of the Patriot 
Act were up for renewal in 2010, debates on the utility, invasiveness, and potential abuse 
of the surveillance provisions ended in congressional reauthorization of the Act without 
alternation. See David Kravets, Lawmakers Punt Patriot Act to Obama, WIRED (Feb. 26, 
2010, 3:52PM), http://www.wired.com/2010/02/lawmakers-renew-patriot-act/. 
100. See Gil Press, The Effectiveness of Small us. Big Data Is Where the NSA Debate 
Should Start, FORBES (June 12, 2013), http://www.furbes.com/sites/gilpress/2013/06112/the-
effuctiveness-of-small-vs-big-data-is-where-the-nsa-debate-should-start (discussing need to 
understand whether a larger or smaller "haystack" of data better enables intelligence-
gathering and analysis efforts). 
101. See, e.g., Felicia Sonmez, Harry Reid, Rand Paul Spar over Patriot Act on Senate 
Floor, WASH. POST (May 25, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/postlharry-
reid-rand-paul-spar-over-patriot-act-on-senate-floor/2011105/25/AGcgWRBH_blog.html (describing 
objections by Senators Rand Paul and Tom Udall to data -gathering provisions being debated 
for renewal as part of the Patriot Act). 
102. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (holding that plaintiffs 
alleging unconstitutional and illegal surveillance lacked standing to bring their complaint 
because they had no publicly available proof of their surveillance). Cases that challenge 
these surveillance programs on constitutional and statutory grounds are still being 
litigated. 
103. See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon 
Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013 06.05 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013 
(jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order. 
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United States who had not engaged in any suspicious activity, other than 
the apparent red flag of being Muslim_I04 
The broad scope, lack of particularized suspicion, and lengthy 
duration of data retention raised substantive concerns_l05 From a 
transparency perspective, concerns arose on two fronts. First, the 
purported legitimacy of the program was based on the fact that its 
parameters and details had been approved in a nonpublic opinion by the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, a nonadversarial body that 
operates largely in secret and has approved virtually every government 
request for surveillance authority that it has considered.1°6 Second, the 
general structure and details of the program were hidden from most 
members of Congress and the public until the Snowden disclosures began. 
Together, these concerns raised the question of whether the NSA's 
metadata collection program was, in fact, based on secret laws and 
without any meaningful understanding of how the government was 
interpreting its surveillance authority. 
One example of problematic interpretation stems from a Senate 
oversight hearing on March 12, 2013, in which Senator Ron Wyden 
specifically asked Director of National Intelligence James Clapper if the 
NSA was systematically collecting information on the communications of 
millions of Americans. 107 Clapper denied this, yet later disclosures 
confirmed that the scope of the NSA's data collection included metadata 
for telephonic communications, as well as content data fore-mails, texts, 
and other such writings. 108 Mter public discussion of the discrepancy in 
104. See Glenn Greenwald & Murtaza Hussain, Meet the Muslim-American Leaders the 
FBI and NSA Have Been Spying on, INTERCEPT (July 9, 2014, 12:01 AM), https://theintercep 
t.com/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/. 
105. The U.S. intelligence community has engaged in numerous programs involving 
warrantless surveillance, and this analysis only considers the bulk metadata collection that 
was arguably authorized under Section 215 of the Patriot Act. Other warrantless 
surveillance--{)fnon-U.S. persons or on non-U.S. territory-falls under the auspices of other 
authorities, such as Executive Order 12333 or Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act. The structural accountability problems raised here with regard to the 
NSA Metadata Program can be extrapolated to consider other domestic surveillance 
questions based on common legal and political frameworks. 
106. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
107. Glenn Kessler, James Clapper's 'Least Untruthful' Statement to the Senate, WASH. 
POST (June 12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fuct-checker/postZjames-clappers-least-
untruthful-statement-to-the-senate/2013/06/llle50677a8-d2d8-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_blog.html. 
Senator Wyden posed the following question: "[D]oes the NSA collect any type of data at all 
on millions or hundreds of millions of Americans?" Clapper responded, "No, sir." I d. 
108. See Siobhan Gorman & Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, New Details Show Broader NSA 
Surveillance Reach, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2013, 11:31 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB 1000142412788732410820457902287 40917324 70.html (describing how seventy-five percent 
of email traffic, including the content of emails, sent or received by United States persons 
is captured by various NSA programs). 
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his testimony, Clapper noted that he and the NSA used a 1982 Defense 
Department regulation to define the word "collect'' to mean the point at 
which searches through the stored data provide results and those results 
are analyzed by a person. 109 Using this definition, Clapper was able to 
argue that "collection'' does not occur at the point at which the data is 
gathered or even when algorithms are used to sort the data for relevance, 
even though a plain reading would suggest otherwise. In fact, common 
understanding suggests that "collection" occurred at any number of 
points earlier in the NSA's data gathering and sorting process, 
particularly since humans were actively querying the database of 
information. 
Although Wyden and others tasked with oversight theoretically could 
have found the 1982 regulatory definition and used it to ask follow up 
questions of Clapper, it seems that if Wyden had used a synonym for 
"collect" that was not an obscurely defined term of art, such as "gather," 
or "intake and store," Clapper might not have been able to mislead 
Congress in his March 2013 testimony. In that sense, Clapper engaged in 
constructive secrecy: the legally operative meaning of "collection" was 
theoretically not a secret, but the administration did not volunteer the 
meaning that it was relying upon and the operative definition was not 
made clear to oversight bodies. Until subsequent disclosures helped 
clarify the dissonance between the publicly understood parameters of the 
NSA's metadata program and the legally operative parameters, the 
administration could retain secrecy around its policy while denying that 
it was secret at all. 
In late 2013 and the years following, the Obama administration 
increased its public willingness to improve protections of privacy and civil 
liberties and improve transparency when those goals were compatible 
with intelligence gathering interests.110 For example, in early 2016 the 
109. See DEP'T OF DEF., PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF DoD INTELLIGENCE 
COMPONENTS THAT AFFECT UNITED STATES PERSONS, DoD 5240.1-R (1982). This regulation 
defines "collection'' as follows: "Information shall be considered as 'collected' only when it 
has been received for use by an employee of a [Department of Defense] intelligence 
component in the course of his official duties .... Data acquired by electronic means is 
'collected' only when it has been processed into intelligible form." Id. § C2.2.1, at 15. 
110. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the United States 
Military Academy Commencement Ceremony (May 28, 2014, 10:22 AM), 
http://www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-offi.ce/20 14/05/28/remarks-president-west-point-
academy-commencement-ceremony ("Our intelligence community has done outstanding 
work, and we have to continue to protect sources and methods. But when we cannot explain 
our efforts clearly and publicly, we face terrorist propaganda and international suspicion, 
we erode legitimacy with our partners and our people, and we reduce accountability in our 
own government .... [W]e're putting in place new restrictions on how America collects and 
uses intelligence--because we will have fewer partners and be less effective if a perception 
takes hold that we're conducting surveillance against ordinary citizens."). In February 2015, 
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NSA's Civil Liberties and Privacy Office issued a newly mandated 
transparency report.lll Among other things, this report clarified that 
newly imposed limitations on data gathering practices were being 
interpreted by the NSA and Congress in the same way, thus alleviating 
some concerns that the NSA was engaging in the type of constructive 
secrecy that had previously allowed misleading statements, like 
Clapper's, to be made to Congress.m 
The primary message from the Obama administration from 2013 
onward was that the Snowden disclosures were unnecessary, illegal, and 
counterproductive to both intelligence-gathering programs and national 
security.l13 Yet, no evidence suggests that any of the accountability 
measures championed by the administration and Congress would have 
existed or gained significant purchase but for the Snowden disclosures.l14 
To the contrary, some within the NSA actively attempted to avoid 
oversight by the Department of Justice_115 Other oversight mechanisms, 
such as the Office of the Inspector General for the NSA,l16 are well-suited 
the Director of National Intelligence announced new limits to the scope of Section 215 
surveillance and intelligence-gathering that largely reflected the type of limitations 
suggested by President Obama in 2014. See ODNI General Counsel Robert Litt's As 
Prepared Remarks on Signals Intelligence Reform at the Brookings Institute (Feb. 4, 2015), 
http://icontherecord. tumblr .com/post/110632851413/odni -general-counsel-robert-litts-as-
prepared. 
111. NSA ClVlL LIBERTIES AND PRIVACY OFFICE, TRANSPARENCY REPORT: THE USA 
FREEDOM ACT BUSINESS RECORDS FISA IMPLEMENTATION (2016), https://:fus.org/irp/nsa!u:fu-
2016.pdf 
112. See id. at 4-7 (including definitions and the applications of the parameters of the 
USA Freedom Act). 
113. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Review of Signals 
Intelligence (Jan. 17, 2014, 11:15 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/tbe-press-office/2014/01117/re 
marks-president-review-signals-intelligence. 
114. Snowden provided written testimony to the European Parliament stating that he 
had attempted to discuss his concerns with regard to various aspects of NSA surveillance 
with superiors within the NSA prior to his public disclosure, but that his efforts were either 
ignored or rebuffed. See Edward J. Snowden, Answers to Written Questions from the 
European Parliament, EVR. PARL. 1, 5 (March 7, 2014), http://www.europarleuropa.eu/docume 
nt/activities/cont/201403/20140307 ATT8067 4/20140307ATT8067 4EN.pd£ 
115. See Barton Gellman, NSA Broke Privacy Rules Thousands of Times per Year, Audit 
Finds, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-
finds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-lle3-a07f-49ddc7 417125_story.html (explaining how NSA 
operatives requesting permission to extend surveillance to a new target were instructed to 
limit the information disclosed to Justice Department "overseers"). 
116. Commentators have suggested that an independently appointed and overseen 
Inspector General for the NSA would provide a better avenue for accountability. See Britt 
Snider & Charles Battaglia, National Security Agency Needs an Independent Inspector 
General, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2013), https://www. washingtonpost.com/opinions/national-
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to deal with allegations of statutory and policy compliance violations, but 
not with a large-scale systemic and philosophical complaint about privacy 
rights such as that of Snowden.117 Other potential avenues for 
accountability, such as the Office of the Inspector General for the Defense 
Department, were rendered impotent by the lack of access to the relevant 
information_118 The extreme secrecy that surrounded these surveillance 
programs, even within the Obama administration, suggests that many 
existing oversight mechanisms were, in the time before the Snowden 
disclosures, not effective and succeeded only in giving a veneer of 
accountability over a program that lacked it. 
D. Contextualizing Private Interpetations 
The fact that so many accountability measures were theoretically in 
place but easily avoidable until the fallout of the Snowden disclosures 
goes to the heart of what concerned the CJEU in Schrems and was part 
of the reason that the CJEU came down so hard on the old Safe Harbor 
agreement. It was not that Schrems or the CJEU could point to a series 
of specific violations ofthe Safe Harbor agreement that actually undercut 
the fundamental privacy rights of an EU citizen. Instead, the CJEU's 
decision was founded on the understanding that, as of 2013, the United 
States was likely maneuvering around the privacy protections and 
oversight mandated in the Safe Harbor agreement by not abiding by 
public understandings of those protections and instead relying on its 
privately held legal interpretations of its obligations. 
In each of the contexts discussed in this Part, the Bush and Obama 
administrations secretly reinterpreted and, therefore, subverted 
commonly understood, ordinary definitions of terms in order to conduct a 
national security related program in a way that arguably violated 
security-agency-needs-an-independent-inspector-general/2013/09/26/ae37d7fc-25f4-11e3-
ad0d-b7c8d2a594b9_story.html?utm_term=.2d5870d0aad1. 
117. See Interviews with NSA officials (various dates, on file with author) (discussing the 
fact that the job of the NSA Inspector General would not have been to discuss the 
"philosophical differences" that Snowden had with the NSA's programmatic and policy 
choices). However, the Inspector General for the NSA has publicly stated that if Snowden 
had complained to the Inspector General, his allegations would have been investigated 
thoroughly. Darren Samuelsohn, NSA Watchdog Talks Snowden, POLITICO (Feb. 25, 2014, 
6:37PM), http://politi.co/NvvjAE. But it seems quite likely that the extent of the Inspector 
General's inquiry would have been to examine the program against the existing statutory 
authority and find that the bulk data collection was statutorily authorized. 
118. See Spencer Ackerman, Pentagon Watchdog 'Not Aware' of NSA Bulk Phone Data 
Collection, GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2014, 3:36PM), http://www.theguardian_com/world/2014/mar/1 
8/pentagon-watchdog-nsa-bulk-phone-collection (saying that the Defense Department Deputy 
Inspector General was unaware of the bulk data collection until learning about it through 
the June 2013 Snowden leaks). 
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international and/or domestic law. Each administration was somewhat 
successful in doing so because the domestic control mechanisms in 
place-internal review within the Executive Branch, Congress, Article III 
courts, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court-failed to 
demand transparency and accountability in how the government was 
interpreting and implementing its obligations under various laws and 
treaties. 
The Privacy Shield emerges in a different context: the control 
mechanisms described in the Privacy Shield, such as the ombudsperson, 
are domestic. However, because the Privacy Shield is a transnational 
agreement, it can be held to account in a more rigorous manner because 
it had to be validated by EU regulators, will be reviewed annually by U.S. 
and EU regulators, and can be invalidated by courts outside ofthe United 
States. EU regulators do not have to wait for the CJEU to consider 
whether the Privacy Shield's protections for the privacy rights of EU 
citizens are adequate. In the interim, EU regulators involved in 
overseeing the implementation of the Privacy Shield can take an active 
role in making sure that the United States is not using its own private 
dictionary in interpreting its obligations under the Privacy Shield. 
III. POTENTIAL CONSTRAINTS AGAINST CONSTRUCTIVE SECRECY 
It is possible that the Trump administration will engage in 
constructive secrecy with the Privacy Shield along the lines of what the 
Bush and Obama administrations did in the contexts of torture, targeted 
killings, and surveillance. As of this writing, it is unclear what kind of 
transparency and rights-protective commitments the Trump 
administration will make and whether it will abide by those 
commitments once they are made. If the Trump administration does 
engage in interpretation that subverts the Privacy Shield, then the 
legally operative interpretation under which the administration acts 
would likely be kept secret from the public, even as public assurances 
suggest compliance with the constraints that most people, including EU 
regulators, believe is part of the agreement. 
The Privacy Shield may be particularly vulnerable to this problem for 
several reasons. First, the same expansive carve-out regarding national 
security that existed in the Safe Harbor agreement is also included in the 
Privacy Shield_119 Second, the 2016 commitments by the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence include a description of the six types of 
data collection that the United States will be entitled to collect in the 
name of national security under the Privacy Shield: detecting and 
119. See Privacy Shield, supra note 7, § 1.5. 
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countering certain activities of foreign powers, counterterrorism, counter-
proliferation, cybersecurity, detecting and countering threats to the 
United States or allied armed forces, and combatting transnational 
criminal threat, including sanctions evasion.l20 Based on current U.S. 
definitions of terrorism and security, 121 these categories are broad enough 
to encompass tremendous swaths of data in a manner that may violate 
EU privacy rights.l22 Third, the agency letters affirming that the U.S. 
interpretation of the parameters of the Privacy Shield adheres to the 
privacy-oriented aspirations of the framework are not legal 
commitments; they are simply a statement of how an agency plans to 
act.123 
As discussed in Part II, reliance on the good faith interpretations of 
the U.S. government regarding national security matters sometimes 
resulted in dissonance between the operative legal definition and the 
public commitment made by the Bush and Obama administrations. 
Under the Trump administration, it is wholly unclear what those public 
commitments would be or whether they would be interpreted consistently 
for internal purposes. If such interpretive dissonance were to occur, the 
privacy rights that the CJEU looked to preserve in Schrems could be 
violated regardless of the external commitments that the United States 
has made in the Privacy Shield or accompanying letters. 
These interpretative concerns, among others, motivated the 
September 2016 suit filed by the privacy activist group, Digital Rights 
Ireland, seeking annulment of the Privacy Shield by the CJEU.124 In its 
complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the Privacy Shield does not comport 
120. See Letter from Robert S. Litt, supra note 33, at 4. 
121. See generally Sudha Setty, What's in a Name? How Nations Define Terrorism Ten 
Years After 9111, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2011) (addressing the extreme broad definitions of 
terrorism in the United States and elsewhere). 
122. See Eur. Comm'n Press Release, Article 29 Working Party Statement on the Decision 
of the European Commission on the ED-U.S. Privacy Shield (July 26, 2016), 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protectionlarticle-29/press-materiallpress-
release/art29_press_material/2016/20160726_wp29_wp_statement_eu_us_privacy_shield_ 
en.pdf (expressing concerns that the Privacy Shield would technically allow for mass 
collection of signals intelligence, as was authorized when the Safe Harbor was in effect) 
[hereinafter Article 29 Working Party Statement]; Katie Bo Williams, US, EU Face 
Blowback on Data Deal, HILL (Feb. 29, 2016, 8:06PM), http:/lthehillcom/policy/cybersecurity/2 
71233-us-eu-fuce-blowback-on-data-deal (discussing concerns that the Privacy Shield likely 
would not withstand scrutiny by the CJEU). 
123. See Peter Teffer, EU and US Agree Data 'Privacy Shield', ED OBSERVER (Feb. 2, 2016, 
7:21 PM), https://euobserver.com/justice/132109 (quoting Sophie in 't Veld, a Liberal 
Member of the European Parliament, as expressing concern that "[t]he assurances seem to 
rely exclusively on political commitment, instead oflegal acts. So any change in the political 
constellation in the US may undo the whole thing"). 
124. See Complaint, Case T-670/16, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Comm'n, 2016 O.J. (C 
410) 26 (filed Sept. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Digital Rights Complaint]. 
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with the requirements of Article 25 of the Data Protection Directive, 
which allows for commercial data transfers so long as there is "an 
adequate level of protection ... by reason of its domestic law or of the 
international commitments it has entered into ... for the protection of 
the private lives and basic freedoms and rights of individuals."l25 The 
plaintiff argues that U.S. domestic law does not adequately protect the 
privacy rights of Europeans and that the Privacy Shield does not rise to 
the level of an "international commitment" such that the standard 
articulated in Article 25 would be satisfied.I26 
Absent another Snowden-like leak, litigation as in Schrems, or the 
CJEU getting involved again as requested in the new Digital Rights 
Ireland case, the EU regulators tasked with reviewing the Privacy Shield 
should consider how to constrain the U.S. executive branch from relying 
on secret interpretations that undermine the objective meaning of the 
agreement. One viable option would be to use the annual review in 2017 
to formalize the norms and methodology used to interpret the Privacy 
Shield, bringing it to the level of an "international commitment" under 
the standard of Article 25 of the Data Protection Directive, instead of 
simply trusting the U.S. government to interpret the limitations of the 
Privacy Shield in a manner that comports with EU privacy standards. 
Interpretive norms coming out of international law, international 
guidance, and other transnational commitments offer useful guidance. 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties127 offers a 
straightforward framework for interpreting treaty language, 
emphasizing in Article 31 that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."128 Article 
31 also affirms that interpretation of a treaty should take into account its 
context, purpose, supplemental documentation, subsequent agreements 
regarding interpretation, subsequent practices regarding interpretation, 
and any relevant rules of applicable internationallaw.l29 In Article 32, 
125. See Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 13, art. 25(6). 
126. See Digital Rights Complaint, supra note 124, at 27 ("Third plea in law, alleging that 
the 'privacy principles' and/or the official (US) 'representations and commitments' ... do not 
constitute 'international commitments' within the meaning of Article 25(6) of Directive 
95/46."). 
127. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter "Vienna Convention"]. 
128. Id. art. 31. 
129. See id. 
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the Vienna Convention goes further to offer additional guidance on means 
of interpretation, noting that: 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of 
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the 
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of 
article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31 ... leaves the 
meaning ambiguous or obscure; or ... leads to a result 
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.l30 
Together, the language in these two Articles would go some distance 
in constraining the executive branch from creating secret and legally 
operative definitions that vary significantly from public commitments 
based on national security related concerns. If added to the language of 
the Privacy Shield, they may even serve to signal to the CJEU and other 
constituencies that the United States is heightening its commitment to 
the protections guaranteed under the Privacy Shield, and that those 
commitments are not subject to the changing whims of an agency, 
administration, or the intelligence community. 
The commitments of Articles 31 and 32 cannot simply be inferred; 
indeed, they would need to be adopted explicitly in the annual review of 
the Privacy Shield, or through another amendment mechanism. The 
Vienna Convention is not legally binding on the parties to the Privacy 
Shield for a number of reasons. First, the Privacy Shield is not a treaty, 
but is a framework applying to private and government actors in two 
jurisdictions (the United States and the European Union) that are subject 
to regulatory and judicial scrutiny_131 Second, the United States is a 
signatory to the Vienna Convention but has not ratified it, although the 
U.S. State Department has noted that it accepts many provisions of the 
Vienna Conventions as constituting customary international law on the 
130. Id. art. 32. 
131. See U.S. DEp'T OF COMMERCE, THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK FAQs 
(2016), https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/medialfiles/2016/fuqs-Bu-us__privacy_sh 
ield_7 -16_sc_cmts.pdf (clarifYing the nature of the Privacy Shield as a "framework'' as opposed 
to "treaty" or other legal instrument). 
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law of treaties.l32 Third, the Vienna Convention has a relatively narrow 
scope and only applies to treaties between states. Iss 
Yet the interpretive standards in the Vienna Convention could 
provide an important touchstone to help formalize and make uniform the 
type of interpretation that the parties to the Privacy Shield purport to 
wantJ34 In statements by U.S. and EU negotiators during the 
development of the Privacy Shield, as well as in the letters provided by 
U.S. regulators when the Privacy Shield was made public, the United 
States promised to act in good faith to uphold privacy standards that 
would pass the scrutiny of the CJEU. If that is truly the case, then 
explicitly tying those commitments to the Vienna Convention's 
interpretive standard should be uncontroversial. 
Explicit incorporation of the interpretive standards of the Vienna 
Convention would be particularly apt because the same standards 
articulated in the Vienna Convention have long been considered useful 
and necessary in a number of public international and transnational 
contexts, private transnational contexts, the canons of U.S. statutory 
interpretation, and the laws and guidance surrounding U.S. contract 
interpretation. The International Law Commission has looked to the 
Vienna Convention in considering how to manage the expansion and 
fragmentation of internationallaw, 135 and the American Law Institute 
has articulated similar interpretive standards for international 
agreements.l36 Other agreements, like the widely used and relied on 
Covenant for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 137 are often 
interpreted using analogous principles that rely upon ordinary and 
132. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/sllltreaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
133. See Vienna Convention, supra note 127, art. 1 ("The present Convention applies to 
treaties between States."). 
134. See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 207-17 (3d ed. 2013) 
(explaining the utility of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention). 
135. E.g., Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 
(2006). Like the Vienna Convention, the Fragmentation Report notes that treaties are not 
to be applied and interpreted in a vacuum. I d. ,1120. The Report notes that "all international 
law exists in a systemic relationship with other law" and, therefore, no treaty application 
can occur without placing the relevant instrument in its contextual environment, which 
suggests that ordinary meanings within the negotiated context must apply when 
interpreting the obligations under an agreement. I d. ,I 423. 
136. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 325(1) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1987) ("An international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose."). 
137. U.N. Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Official Records: 
Documents of the Conference and Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the 
Meetings of the Main Committees, at 178--90, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 97/19 (Apr. 11, 1980). 
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common understandings of terms. 138 Such an interpretive methodology is 
also common in U.S. domestic contract law139 and judicial interpretation 
of statutes. 140 Therefore, using the interpretive standards articulated in 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention should not only be 
uncontroversial as a matter of transnational norm creation, but also as a 
matter of substance because the norm in domestic law is to give ordinary 
meanings to words in contracts and statutes. 
This is not to suggest that such explicit incorporation of interpretive 
norms would resolve all of the current concerns involving the Privacy 
Shield. Indeed, the complaint in the new Digital Rights Ireland case 
alleges many substantive and procedural failureE in the Privacy Shield, 
many of which echo the concerns voiced by the Article 29 Working Party 
of data protection commissioners in EU member states reviewing the 
Privacy Shield.l41 Yet, dealing with the problem of potential interpretive 
dissonance in a manner that follows international, transnational, and 
domestic precedent provides a simple path to improving the Privacy 
Shield and, perhaps, resolving one of the issues that privacy rights groups 
and the CJEU have justifiably raised in the past. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the key problems of constructive secrecy is the creation of 
public commitments that appear to adequately hold the U.S. government 
to account, but the reality is that those commitments present only a 
138. See, e.g., Frank Diedrich, Maintaining Uniformity in International Uniform Law via 
Autonomous Interpretation: Software Contracts and the CISG, 8 PACE INT'L L. REV. 303, 
317-18 (1996) (noting that the Vienna Convention's interpretive methodology and reliance 
on common and ordinary meanings of terms is used to resolve disputes in textual meaning). 
139. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 203(a) (AM. LAWINST. 1981) ("[A]n 
interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all terms is 
preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no 
effect .... "); U.C.C. § 1-303 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2001) ("[T]he express 
terms of an agreement and any applicable course of performance, course of dealing, or usage 
of trade must be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each other."). 
140. See Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) ("[C]anons of 
construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of 
legislation, and in interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal 
canon before all others .... [C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what 
it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are 
unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete."') (citations 
omitted); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 471 (1917) (establishing the plain 
meaning rule of statutory construction). 
141. See Article 29 Working Party Statement, supra note 122. 
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fac;ade of accountability because the legally operative, private 
commitments made by the government are substantially different. These 
legal "grey holes" provide a dangerous false comfort regarding 
government accountability, transparency, and the maintenance of the 
rule of law_142 Time and again in the last fifteen years, the U.S. 
government has invoked national security concerns to provide such false 
comfort in reassuring the public that it is upholding its domestic and 
international legal commitments, only for subsequent disclosures to 
make clear that those reassurances were either definitely or arguably ill-
founded. The concerns expressed by the CJEU in Schrems reflect its 
discomfort with the U.S. reliance on constructive secrecy and the false 
sense of comfort it provides. The Privacy Shield attempts to remedy that 
situation by increasing oversight of U.S. companies conducting 
transnational data transfers and by seeking overt commitments from 
U.S. government agencies that the privacy protections for EU citizens 
will rise to a level that would likely survive subsequent scrutiny by the 
CJEU. 
Perhaps the CJEU will uphold the Privacy Shield as satisfying the 
Data Protection Directive, but the September 2016 suit brought by 
Digital Rights Ireland highlights the doubts as to whether the language 
in the Privacy Shield adequately constrains the U.S. government. 
Further, the CJEU continues to make it clear in its jurisprudence that it 
will enforce the privacy rights of EU citizens even in the face of strong 
arguments about the need for potentially intrusive data collection in the 
name of national security .143 
The CJEU may also be skeptical of the efficacy of the Privacy Shield 
based on a lack of transparency and concerns as to how the Trump 
administration will interpret its privacy commitments under the 
agreement. A January 25, 2017 Executive Order requires federal 
agencies to limit privacy protections for non-U.S. citizens,l44 an action 
that immediately led European lawmakers to express uncertainty 
regarding the U.S. commitment to the Privacy Shield_145 Other comments 
142. See David Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside 
the Legal Order?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2005, 2026 (2006). 
143. See Tele2, supra note 12, ,I'll 72-73 (reasoning that invocations of national security 
did not justifY the type of bulk data collection at issue in the case). 
144. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order: Enhancing Public Safety in the 
Interior of the United States (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2017/0l/25/presidential-executive-order-enhancing-public-safety-interior-united 
("Agencies shall, to the extent consistent with applicable law, ensure that their privacy 
policies exclude persons who are not United States citizens or lawful permanent residents 
from the protections of the Privacy Act regarding personally identifiable information."). 
145. E.g., Jeff John Roberts, U.S. Tech Industry Wants Trump to Calm EU Data Fears, 
FORTUNE (Feb. 2, 2017) http:/lfortune.com/2017/02/02/trump-privacy-shield/ (describing 
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made by members of the Trump administration calling for a reduction of 
privacy protections in the name of national security have further 
increased skepticism as to whether the Privacy Shield will be enforced as 
written. 146 In fact, in early April 2017, the European Parliament passed 
a resolution asking the European Commission to undertake its upcoming 
2017 review of the Privacy Shield with an eye toward better 
understanding how the United States has thus far interpreted its 
obligations under the agreement.l47 
None ofthese developments will reassure the CJEU that the Privacy 
Shield is an adequate framework to protect the privacy rights of EU 
citizens. The precarity of the Privacy Shield undermines confidence in 
both the enforcement of fundamental privacy protections and the viability 
of businesses that depend on data transfers. This makes it all the more 
important for the United States to make the interpretative methodology 
of the Privacy Shield a matter of public record, an international 
commitment, and a subject of external accountability. Doing so would not 
ameliorate all of the concerns surrounding the P~ivacy Shield, but it 
would strengthen the U.S. government's argument that it ought to be 
trusted in this context. 
concerns of a former Federal Trade Commissioner that the executive order could make 
European lawmakers skittish about the U.S. application of the Privacy Shield); Natasha 
Lomas, Trump Order Strips Privacy Rights from Non-U.S. Citizens, Could Nix EU-US Data 
Flows, TECH CRUCNH (Jan. 26, 20 17), https://techcrunch.com/2017/01126/trump-{)rder-strips-
privacy-rights-from-non-u-s-citizens-rould-nix-eu-us-data-flows/ (noting concerns of a Member of 
the European Parliament as to the uncertain enforcement of the Privacy Shield in light of 
the executive order). 
146. See Melanie Teplinsky, Opinion: Will Trump Sink Privacy Shield?, CHRISTIAN Scr. 
MONITOR (Feb. 24, 201 7), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2017/0224/ 
Opinion-Will-Trump-sink-Privacy-Shield. 
147. See Catherine Stupp, MEPs Want Commission to Toughen up Privacy Shield Under 
Trump, EURACTIV (Apr. 7, 2017), httpJ/www.euractiv.com/section/data-protectionlnews/meps-
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